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_______________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
 
 Sean Moffitt moves to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255. His primary argument is that his lawyer was constitutionally ineffective for 
failing to raise a sentencing entrapment defense at his jury trial. Because Moffitt cannot 
demonstrate prejudice under the Supreme Court’s Strickland doctrine, we will affirm the 
District Court’s denial of his motion.  
I. 
A.   
This case involves a reverse-sting operation: an undercover law enforcement agent 
posing as a dissatisfied drug courier proposed robbing a fictional stash house. With the 
promise of a big payday, the agent enlisted a handful of willing participants, including 
Sean Moffitt. When Moffitt took steps in furtherance of the crime, he was arrested and 
prosecuted.  
In April 2012, Bruce Stukey, an undercover agent of the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”), met Chad Revis (Moffitt’s cousin) through a 
confidential informant. Agent Stukey held himself out as “Jake,” a disgruntled courier for 
a cocaine trafficking organization. In that guise, Agent Stukey complained that his drug 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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organization had denied him a lucrative selling role, instead relegating him to 
deliveryman. Agent Stukey told Revis he planned to rob the organization’s stash house, 
which stored twelve to eighteen kilograms of cocaine.  
Although Agent Stukey set the robbery scheme in motion, Revis undertook 
important next steps. On May 2, 2012, Revis introduced Agent Stukey to Sean Moffitt 
and Edward Harris (Moffitt’s uncle), both of whom expressed interest in joining the 
robbery scheme. Before the meeting, Revis told Agent Stukey that Moffitt and Harris 
need not know the quantity of drugs they would steal. Agent Stukey disagreed and 
described the plan to all three men, including the amount of drugs involved. When the 
meeting ended, the plan was for all four men to participate in the robbery of the fictitious 
stash house. 
But the plan changed. At the meeting, Moffitt and Harris became suspicious that 
Revis understated the amount of drugs targeted. Moffitt later testified that Agent Stukey 
told them that the stash house would likely have around ten kilograms of cocaine. Moffitt 
and Harris decided to cut Revis out of the scheme. Harris then called Agent Stukey and 
asked for a follow-up meeting, which was to include Moffitt but exclude Revis, and also 
requested that Revis not be informed about the meeting.  
 Thus Moffitt and Harris initiated a second meeting. This meeting was secretly 
recorded on video with sound by Agent Stukey. Moffitt and Harris argued that Agent 
Stukey should cut out Revis, with Harris stating: “We’re the guns. I’m the [expletive] 
man. [Moffitt] is my right-hand man.” Gov’t Ex. 8, at 4:00.  Moffitt explained that he and 
Harris were more experienced than Revis at robbing stash houses, stating “that’s why 
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[Revis] called us.” Gov’t Ex. 8, at 6:36. Throughout the conversation, Moffitt was 
enthusiastic, telling Agent Stukey, “we really want to do this thing.” Gov’t Ex. 8, at 4:16. 
Harris stated that Agent Stukey’s offer was a “blessing,” which Moffitt verbally agreed 
with. Gov’t Ex. 8 at 4:40. Harris stated that he would treat Agent Stukey fairly “so we 
could do it the [expletive] again,” which Moffitt again verbally agreed with. Gov’t Ex. 8, 
at 7:16. Agent Stukey feigned hesitation and twice said that he needed to “process” 
everything. This led Moffitt and Harris to pressure Agent Stukey to include them in the 
robbery. Harris touted their robbery experience, explaining “we done pulled off licks; we 
hit [people] for 20 bricks before.” Gov’t Ex. 8, at 13:39.1 He also assured Agent Stukey 
that they would “walk [him] through” the process. Gov’t Ex. 8, at 11:15. 
 Throughout the recorded conversation, Moffitt and his coconspirators were 
explicit about their understanding of the amount of cocaine involved in the robbery. 
Moffitt and Harris expressed their suspicion that Revis had underrepresented the amount 
of cocaine involved in order to deprive them of the robbery’s fruits, with Moffitt saying, 
“the stuff [Revis] told us was totally different than what you told us.” Gov’t Ex. 8, at 
3:53. Moffitt added that Revis told them they would only be taking “two or three ounces 
[of cocaine] a piece.” Gov’t Ex. 8, at 5:50. But he said he knew Revis was lying when he 
said there were only “nine ounces at most” of cocaine. Gov’t Ex. 8, at 12:10. Later in the 
conversation, Agent Stukey confirmed that there would likely be eight to twelve 
kilograms of cocaine at the stash house, and Moffitt nodded his head and said, “See!” 
                                              
1  One “brick” of cocaine is one kilogram. In Pittsburgh, as of 2012, a kilogram of 
cocaine had a value of approximately $30,000.  
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Gov’t Ex. 8, at 10:27. In response to Agent Stukey’s disclaimer that there could be 
slightly more or less drugs than that, Harris said, “whatever it is, we will split it three 
ways,” and Moffitt again verbally agreed. Gov’t Ex. 8, at 10:45. 
 During the recorded conversation, Moffitt and Harris explicitly expressed their 
readiness to use violence to pull off the robbery. In explaining why Agent Stukey needed 
their help, Harris got to the heart of the matter: “Dealing with that much [cocaine], it ain’t 
like those [people] are gonna be like ‘well here you can just have it’ [so] we’re the ones 
[you need].” Gov’t Ex. 8, at 12:18. Moffitt agreed, saying “it might get ugly.” Gov. Ex. 8, 
at 12:30. 
The next day, Moffitt, Harris, and another individual, Tone,2 met Agent Stukey at 
a restaurant. At this meeting––also secretly recorded on video with sound––Moffitt asked 
Agent Stukey for the stash house’s location. The stash house moved around, Agent 
Stukey explained, and his superiors often told him the location at the last minute, giving 
him a brief window in which to seize the cocaine. Stukey asked whether the men had the 
firearms needed to accomplish the robbery, and Moffitt assured him they did. Moffitt 
even said they would come with “weapons of mass destruction.” S.A. 131.  Harris 
reiterated his and Moffitt’s qualifications for the job: “We do this. This is what we do, 
and we got good connections.” Gov’t Ex. 9 at 22:54. 
 Less than a week later, Agent Stukey called Harris and told him the robbery would 
take place the next day. Harris called Agent Stukey the following morning to confirm the 
robbery was still on schedule. Agent Stukey instructed Harris to meet him at the Knight’s 
                                              
2  Agent Stukey testified that he never had contact with Tone again after this meeting.  
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Inn in Bridgeville, Pennsylvania. Harris arrived with an accomplice, whom Harris had 
recruited to help with the scheme. Harris explained to Agent Stukey that his crew was 
ready and nearby in two different vehicles. Harris then rode with Agent Stukey to pick up 
a van he believed would be used in the robbery. Agent Stukey asked, and Harris 
confirmed, that the rest of the robbery “crew” were the people that Agent Stukey had met 
at the restaurant, i.e., Moffitt and Tone. When they arrived at the supposed robbery van, 
Harris and another accomplice, who had followed them to the van, were arrested.  
 Unaware of the arrests and in a series of phone calls, Moffitt pressed Agent Stukey 
for the stash house location. Agent Stukey in turn asked to meet Moffitt in person. 
Moffitt declined Agent Stukey’s repeated requests, explaining he did not want to ride 
around with “all of the artillery.” S.A. 143. Moffitt later admitted he was in the 
Bridgeville area that morning, near where the robbery would take place. After additional 
conversations, Agent Stukey called off the robbery. Moffitt was arrested later. 
B. 
 A grand jury indicted Moffitt, Harris, and the accomplice, charging them with two 
counts of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute and attempting to possess and 
distribute, five kilograms or more of cocaine. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 
841(b)(1)(A)(ii)(II), 846. The day before trial, Harris pleaded guilty to both counts of the 
indictment.3  
                                              
3  Harris was sentenced to 200 months’ incarceration and five years of supervised 
release. On July 14, 2015, Harris’s sentence was reduced to 150 months, after the United 
States Sentencing Commission amended U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 to decrease the base offense 
level for drug offenses by 2 levels and applied this amendment retroactively.  
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Moffitt proceeded to trial, employing a trial strategy focusing on his innocence. 
His trial counsel argued Moffitt was innocent, that he was just “play[ing] along,” and had 
no intent “to be part of any of the actions.” S.A. 78. Moffitt testified before the jury that 
he had never intended to go along with Agent Stukey’s scheme, and that he was just 
feigning interest in the robbery. He did not deny that he attended a subsequent lunch with 
the co-conspirators, who discussed the logistics for the planned robbery. On cross-
examination, Moffitt struggled to answer questions and became frustrated, repeatedly 
refusing to answer questions. For example, Moffitt testified on direct examination he had 
previously trafficked in heroin, but only heroin. On cross-examination, after several 
evasive answers, Moffitt admitted he had also been convicted of trafficking cocaine—the 
drug at issue in the present case. As another example, Moffitt struggled to explain what 
he was doing on the day of the robbery. Although he claimed he was at his aunt’s house 
for part of that day, he admitted he did not know her address.  
 Throughout the trial, Moffitt focused on his innocence and his lawyer stuck to that 
strategy. Although the District Court ultimately gave a jury instruction on entrapment, 
Moffitt’s lawyer did not argue entrapment before the jury and Moffitt did not testify to 
anything suggesting he was entrapped. When the district judge asked Moffitt’s counsel 
whether he wanted an entrapment jury instruction, Moffitt’s counsel did ask for it. But he 
acknowledged that he might later request removing it and that it was “not necessary” 
because Moffitt’s “defense [was] focused on a denial that he was ever in a conspiracy.” 
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S.A. 388. Moffitt’s counsel also told the district judge that “entrapment is something that 
we haven’t pursued . . . with our defense and our theory of defense.” S.A. 389.4  
The jury convicted Moffitt of both counts. 
C.  
 Because of his career offender status, Moffitt was sentenced to a statutorily 
mandated term of life imprisonment. Days before trial, the government filed a notice 
under 21 U.S.C. § 851 (the “851 notice”), establishing that Moffitt had two or more prior 
convictions for felony drug offenses. This notice triggered 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), 
which mandates a life sentence for persons convicted of, inter alia, an offense under 
§ 841 after two or more prior felony drug convictions.5 See id. At the sentencing hearing 
on February 5, 2014, the court sentenced Moffitt to life imprisonment.  
D. 
On direct appeal, Moffitt challenged only the admission of two prior convictions 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), and we affirmed. See United States v. Moffitt, 
601 F. App’x 152 (3d Cir. 2015). Moffitt then filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, which the District Court denied.6 We granted a 
                                              
4  The District Court also instructed the jury to acquit Moffitt if it found “that the 
government conduct in this case with respect to Sean Moffitt is so outrageous as to be 
shocking in the universal sense of justice . . . under the due process clause . . . .” S.A. 537. 
 
5  Moffitt’s counsel obtained a continuance during sentencing as part of an attempt to 
persuade the government to withdraw the 851 notice. The United States Attorney’s Office 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania declined to revoke the 851 notice.  
 
6  The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a). See United States v. Davenport, 775 F.3d 605, 608 
n.4 (3d Cir. 2015). 
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certificate of appealability limited to two questions: (1) whether “counsel was ineffective 
for failing to argue, at sentencing, that Moffitt should have been sentenced at a lesser 
drug quantity because the Government unfairly exaggerated the quantity of cocaine with 
which he was charged;” and (2) whether “counsel was ineffective for failing to request a 
jury instruction that would have allowed the jury to find Moffitt guilty at a lesser drug 
quantity for the same reason.”7  
II. 
In reviewing the District Court’s decision to summarily dismiss Moffitt’s motion 
for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, we must consider whether “the motion and the files 
and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” See 
United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 41 (3d Cir. 1992) (articulating the standard of review). 
But “the question of whether to order a hearing is committed to the sound discretion of 
the district court . . . . Accordingly, we review this matter to determine if the trial court 
abused its discretion” in declining to order a hearing.8 Id.  
                                              
 
7  After granting a certificate of appealability, we appointed David R. Fine of K&L 
Gates LLP to serve as Moffitt’s counsel. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). We express our 
appreciation to Mr. Fine for accepting this matter pro bono and for capably briefing and 
arguing this case. 
8  The Sixth Amendment guarantees “the right to the effective assistance of counsel.” 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 
U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)). “Regardless of whether an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim is raised in a motion for a new trial, on collateral review, or on direct appeal, the 
standard of review is the same.” United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 203-04 (3d 
Cir. 2017). “We exercise plenary review over the legal component” of the claim and 
“review the underlying facts for clear error, but exercise independent judgment on whether 
those facts, as found by the District Court, show that counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance.” Davenport, 775 F.3d at 608 (citation omitted).  
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Moffitt contends that both his trial counsel and sentencing counsel were 
constitutionally ineffective for failing to raise a sentencing entrapment defense. In the 
context of drug distribution crimes, the contention is that the defendant lacked the 
culpability to traffic in the amount of drugs charged—i.e., more than five kilograms of 
cocaine in Moffitt’s case. A defendant asserting sentencing entrapment “argues that, 
although predisposed to commit a minor or lesser offense, he has been entrapped into 
committing a greater offense subject to greater punishment.” United States v. Ciszkowski, 
492 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir. 2007).  
                                              
 
Under Strickland’s two-part standard, Moffitt must show both that “counsel 
performed deficiently and that counsel’s deficient performance caused him prejudice.” 
Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 775 (2017) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). To satisfy 
Strickland’s deficiency prong, Moffitt must show that counsel’s performance “fell below 
an objective standard of reasonableness.” 466 U.S. at 688. “Strickland’s first prong sets a 
high bar.” Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 775. Defense lawyers “face[] any number of choices about 
how best to make a client’s case.” Id. Thus, a lawyer’s conduct is objectively reasonable 
“so long as his decisions fall within the ‘wide range of professionally competent 
assistance.’” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). 
  
Under Strickland’s second prong, Moffitt must show that he was prejudiced by 
counsel’s deficient performance. The prejudice standard is demanding: “It is not enough 
for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of 
the proceeding.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. Rather, “the defendant must show that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceedings would have been different.” Id. at 594. A reasonable probability is “a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. We may resolve an 
ineffectiveness claim under either prong. Id. at 697 (“If it is easier to dispose of an 
ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should 
be followed.”). 
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Moffitt concedes he had previously dealt with “modest volumes of drugs.” 
Appellant Br. at 22. But he contends he would not have been willing to traffic eight to 
twelve kilograms of cocaine if Agent Stukey had not entrapped him.  
Neither the Supreme Court nor the Third Circuit has yet endorsed a sentencing 
entrapment defense. See Washington, 869 F.3d at 210; United States v. Sed, 601 F.3d 
224, 229-230 (3d Cir. 2010). And courts of appeals have divided on whether to recognize 
the defense. Five courts of appeals have recognized some form of sentencing 
entrapment,9 with some setting demanding standards.10 But four other courts of appeals 
have declined to recognize a sentencing entrapment defense.11 
                                              
9  The Eighth and the Ninth Circuits focus on the “defendant’s predisposition” to deal 
in a certain quantity of drugs. See United States v. Yuman-Hernandez, 712 F.3d 471, 475 
(9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that the focus of the analysis is on predisposition and that a 
defendant has the burden of showing either a lack of intent or a lack of capability to deal 
in the quantity of drugs charged); United States v. Martin, 583 F.3d 1068, 1073 (8th Cir. 
2009). The First Circuit, in contrast, “focuses primarily on the behavior and motives of the 
government.” United States v. Jaca-Nazario, 521 F.3d 50, 58 (1st Cir. 2008). And the 
District of Columbia and Seventh Circuits appear to consider both the defendant’s 
predisposition and the government’s conduct. See United States v. Mack, 841 F.3d 514, 
523–24 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“[S]entencing entrapment occurs if the government induces a 
defendant to commit a more serious crime when he was predisposed to commit a less 
serious offense.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted); United States v. Turner, 569 F.3d 
637, 641 (7th Cir. 2009) (“The defendant must show (1) that he lacked a predisposition to 
commit the crime, and (2) that his will was overcome by unrelenting government 
persistence.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
 
10  See, e.g., Turner, 569 F.3d at 641 (describing a “high bar” and requiring 
“unrelenting government persistence”); Jaca-Nazario, 521 F.3d at 58 (requiring 
“extraordinary misconduct” by the government) (quoting United States v. Barbour, 393 
F.3d 82, 86 (1st Cir. 2004)). 
 
11  See United States v. Macedo-Flores, 788 F.3d 181, 187 (5th Cir. 2015) (“This court 
has never recognized sentencing entrapment as a defense, but we have consistently noted 
that, were we to accept the defense, it would only be cognizable in cases involving ‘true 
entrapment,’ or where there is proof of ‘overbearing and outrageous conduct’ on the 
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III. 
 As noted, Moffitt contends that both his trial counsel and sentencing counsel were 
constitutionally ineffective for failing to raise a sentencing entrapment defense. We 
disagree. There is no reasonable probability that raising a sentencing entrapment defense 
would have altered the outcome at trial or sentencing. Accordingly, both of Moffitt’s 
ineffective assistance claims fail under Strickland’s second prong, and the District Court 
did not abuse its discretion in declining to hold an evidentiary hearing.  
A. 
Moffitt cannot establish trial counsel’s decision to forego a sentencing entrapment 
defense prejudiced him. Even if a sentencing entrapment argument had been made and a 
corresponding jury instruction had been sought, the outcome would have been unchanged 
because the record did not support such a defense. “A defendant is entitled to an 
instruction on his theory of the case where the record contains evidentiary support for it.” 
United States v. Weatherly, 525 F.3d 265, 270 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted).     
We conclude the record does not support a sentencing entrapment defense.  
Nothing in the record suggests that Agent Stukey coerced or placed pressure on Moffitt to 
participate. Cf. United States v. Mayfield, 771 F.3d 417, 422, 441 (7th Cir. 2014) (en 
                                              
Government’s part.”) (citations omitted); United States v. Guest, 564 F.3d 777, 781 (6th 
Cir. 2009) (“The Sixth Circuit has already addressed sentencing entrapment . . . [and it] 
does not recognize [the] defense.”); United States v. Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th 
Cir. 2007) (“While our Circuit does not recognize sentencing entrapment as a viable 
defense, we do recognize the outrageous government conduct defense, and we have 
considered sentencing manipulation as a viable defense.”); United States v. Ramos, 462 
F.3d 329, 335 (4th Cir. 2006). 
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banc) (faulting the government for “pair[ing] the reward of a stash-house robbery with an 
extended campaign of persuasion that played on Mayfield’s financial need and 
culminated in a veiled threat of reprisal from a vicious street gang”).  The opposite was 
true here. Agent Stukey initially targeted Revis, who then introduced Stukey to Moffitt 
and Harris. Cf. id. at 420-21 (finding sentencing entrapment plausible in case where 
government agent directly recruited defendant and played on his known financial 
difficulties). But Moffitt and Harris cut Revis out of the scheme––they pitched their 
services to Agent Stukey over the course of their meetings during which they bragged 
about their prior robberies. At one point, Moffitt exclaimed: “We really want to do this 
thing.” Gov’t Ex. 8, at 4:16.  
Nor was there any evidence that Agent Stukey induced Moffitt to steal a larger 
quantity of drugs than he was predisposed to steal. Moffitt and Harris bragged about prior 
criminal activity, including stealing 20 kilograms of cocaine. Revis initially 
underreported the amount of cocaine involved, making Moffitt immediately suspicious 
that Stukey could offer him more drugs. And Moffitt’s interest in the robbery persisted 
after Stukey corrected Revis’s statement and told them the stash house contained in 
excess of five kilograms. There was no hesitation on Moffitt’s part about the quantity 
being beyond his predisposition. On the contrary, he acknowledged that the opportunity 
was a “blessing.” Gov’t Ex. 8 at 4:40. These statements demonstrate Moffitt was not a 
hesitant member of the conspiracy, and that he was ready and eager to steal eight to 
twelve kilograms of cocaine. In other words, the facts of this case do not support a 
sentencing entrapment defense.  
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Second, making a sentencing entrapment defense would have been inconsistent 
with his trial counsel’s strategy. Throughout the case, Moffitt argued he was innocent and 
lacked conspiratorial intent. When Moffitt took the stand, he testified he was just 
“playing along” with the stash house conspiracy and that he was innocent of the charges; 
he never mentioned anything suggestive of entrapment. His trial counsel never mentioned 
any sort of entrapment in his opening statement, cross-examination of the government’s 
witnesses, direct examination of Moffitt himself, or his closing argument. Moffitt’s trial 
strategy was focused entirely on his innocence. Moffitt’s trial counsel recognized that 
advancing a traditional entrapment defense stood in some tension with his innocence 
strategy, and he suggested to the district judge that Moffitt might not even want that 
instruction, though it was requested and ultimately given. Advancing a sentencing 
entrapment defense would have been an even more awkward fit with Moffitt’s trial 
strategy, because it would have required conceding some culpability. Throughout the 
trial, Moffitt demonstrated he was not willing to do this, insisting he was innocent 
altogether.  
Third, the quantity of drugs proffered by law enforcement in this case would not 
make out a sentencing entrapment defense in some circuits. In this case, there is 
testimony that the quantity of drugs chosen, eight to twelve kilograms, was based on law 
enforcement’s understanding of what a typical stash house in the Pittsburgh area would 
contain. At no time during the trial, or on appeal, has Moffitt contended that this is not 
the typical amount of drugs found in a Pittsburgh stash house. Among the circuits that do 
recognize a sentencing entrapment defense, some authority finds it inapplicable if law 
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enforcement invents an amount of drugs that is found in a typical stash house in the area. 
For example, the Seventh Circuit held that, unless there are other facts suggesting 
coercion, it will not find sentencing entrapment where law enforcement invents a quantity 
of drugs that would be typically found in local stash houses. See Mayfield, 771 F.3d at 
422, 441 (stating that an amount less than twenty kilograms of cocaine is typical in the 
relevant locality); see also United States v. Hare, 820 F.3d 93, 103 (4th Cir. 2016) 
(stating, in the context of a due process claim, that “15 to 20 kilograms of cocaine” is not 
an “outrageous . . . inducement”). Stated differently, it is not an “illegitimate inducement” 
if law enforcement creates a sting involving enough drugs to constitute a “typical stash-
house robbery.” Id. at 441. The idea behind this rationale is that the sting would be less 
likely to work if law enforcement were to choose an artificially low amount of cocaine.  
Because we conclude that Moffitt suffered no prejudice from his trial counsel’s 
failure to raise a sentencing entrapment defense before the jury, it is unnecessary to 
decide whether his counsel rendered deficient assistance of counsel.  
B. 
Moffitt’s attack on sentencing counsel’s performance fares no better. Moffitt 
cannot establish prejudice at sentencing because, even if counsel had raised a sentencing 
entrapment defense, there is no reasonable probability that his sentence would have been 
different.  
As noted, a jury convicted Moffitt of conspiracy to possess with intent to 
distribute, and attempting to possess and distribute, five kilograms or more of cocaine. 
Both the verdict and the government’s 851 notice required the trial court to impose a life 
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sentence. There is no reasonable probability the outcome would have been different if 
Moffitt’s counsel had asserted a sentencing entrapment defense under these 
circumstances.    
In reviewing Moffitt’s ineffective assistance claims, we must “judge the 
reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed 
as of the time of counsel’s conduct.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Here, the facts do not 
support a sentencing entrapment defense at trial or at sentencing. Accordingly, trial 
counsel and sentencing counsel were not constitutionally ineffective. 
* * * 
Moffitt did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel at his trial or sentencing. 
Although his statutorily-mandated life sentence is harsh, and we have continued concerns 
about reverse sting operations by law enforcement, this case does not turn on those 
issues.  
V. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the trial court’s order denying Moffitt’s 
motion.  
